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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the factors that influence Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
of government interventions in a chaotic and complex organisational 
environment. The central argument is that many factors from the natural and 
man-made (intellectual) environment affect the evaluation of government 
interventions. However, despite approximately three decades of M&E studies, 
there is currently no known study that has focused on the effects of the different 
factors that influence the M&E of government interventions. The objective of this 
paper is to critically analyse the effects of different environmental factors on 
M&E of government interventions. This paper is an attempt to close the 
knowledge gap in the current literature. This research is qualitative and is based 
on a robust literature review of the existing literature on M&E and the theory of 
change, chaos and complexity. The research followed an interpretive, social 
constructivist paradigm which basically starts from an assumption that when 
M&E experts, scholars and practitioners construct meaning of their world, and in 
making sense of that world, they are influenced by their historical, economic, 
social and cultural backgrounds. This paradigm resonates well with the 
research’s central objective of identifying, explaining and interpreting the 
environmental factors that influence M&E. The main finding in this paper is that 
there are many natural and intellectual (man-made) environmental factors that 
affect M&E. Change caused by these environmental factors is chaotic, complex 
and unpredictable. The effects of these environmental factors on the M&E of 
government interventions is inevitable because organisations are open systems. 
An M&E endeavour which ignores the effects of natural and intellectual (man-
made) environmental factors on M&E cannot produce accurate information and 
valid recommendations. Therefore, M&E scholars, professionals and 
practitioners should take into account the environmental context in which M&E is 
done in order to produce more accurate M&E results and valid recommendations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the factors that influence M&E of 
government interventions in a chaotic and complex organisational environment. 
The paper starts with a conceptual analysis to explain M&E of government 
interventions and proceeds with a contextual analysis to discuss the causes of 
chaos and complexity in the M&E of government interventions and the 
environment and how such chaos and complexity within the organisational 
complicate/affect M&E. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of what can 
be done to evaluate government interventions in a complex and chaotic 
organisational environment and the recommendations for future research. 
2. MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E): A CONCEPTUAL AND 
CONTEXTUAL ORIENTATION 
Monitoring is “a continuous function/process that uses systematic methods to 
collect data on specific performance indicators of government interventions in 
order to provide management and the main stakeholders with facts and evidence 
for failure or success of an ongoing development intervention in order to track the 
extent of progress towards the achievement of objectives and progress in the use 
of allocated funds” (Kusek and Rist, 2004:12). Monitoring requires an up-to-date 
documented plan of the intervention, showing clearly what government 
intervention is being implemented, when it must be implemented (start date, mid-
term milestone dates, completion date), where exactly the intervention is supposed 
to be implemented, why it is implemented (the registered/recorded problem or 
problems that necessitated the intervention in question), who the beneficiaries 
and/or stakeholders are, who is responsible for what actions in the implementation 
process, how everything must proceed, etc. (Nalubega & Uwizeyimana, 2019:2). 
Monitors (or monitoring officers) must record the data (and information) about 
the status (progress) of the government intervention as they see it happening (but 
do not have to explain why) (Uwizeyimana, 2019). 
A closer look at Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill, and Krathwohl’s (1956) Taxonomy 
in Figure 1 shows that monitors only need to see, observe, recognise, and recall 
the facts (i.e. to remember) and to (correctly) capture the observed facts in a 
record system (a database, datasheet, and/or an electronic device such as a 
computer). Monitoring must be conducted on regular basis (hourly, daily) in order 
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to avoid missing valuable data and information. This is why the concept of 
monitoring is also defined as the ability to systematically track progress made 
against the adopted plan on a regular basis and to ensure compliance with the 
aspects contained in the (implementation) plan (Ho, 2003:68-70). Monitoring 
progress in terms of “outputs” gathers data on service delivery and policy 
implementation, while monitoring progress in terms of “outcomes” gathers and 
presents data on the worth and value of the intervention itself (Ho, 2003:68-70). 
The function of monitors (or monitoring officers) is important because they help 
to capture (record and safely store) data and information that are used to conduct 
evaluations.  
Evaluation uses and depends on the data and information collected through 
systematic monitoring of government interventions (Salandy, 2018). As such, 
monitoring is a prerequisite for evaluation because without it, it is almost 
impossible to objectively “determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, 
development efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability” of government 
interventions (Rabie and Goldman, 2014:4-6). One must therefore conduct 
systematic and objective monitoring of government interventions in order to 
evaluate their performance (Saunders, 2015:3).  
Rabie and Cloete (2009:2) distinguish between formal and informal evaluation. 
They argue that “informal evaluations inform daily decisions on how good or bad, 
desirable or undesirable something is” and that formal evaluations are “more 
systematic and rigorous … with appropriate controls for the effects of extraneous 
environmental factors that could have an impact on the validity and reliability of 
the findings and conclusions” (Rabie and Cloete, 2009:2). Evaluation should take 
a systematic approach to evaluate every aspect of the different parts of the 
logframe from the quality and quantity of the input, the efficiency and economy in 
the acquisition, and the allocation (or use) of the input, the efficiency in the 
transformation of the input into output, the quality and quantity of output, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the output, the effectiveness and efficiency in how 
the output achieved the outcomes, to the efficiency and effectiveness in the way 
the outcomes have achieved the impacts (Uwizeyimana 2019). This means that 
systematic evaluation should go beyond focusing on the “intended output, 
outcomes and impact” (what) to include and explain (why) the [what] that is 
observed happened that way (Uwizeyimana, 2019). 
Huitt’s (2011) “Bloom et al.’s Taxonomy of the Cognitive Domain” shows that 
evaluation is more than just comparing status quo ante (so-called baseline data: 
before the policy project was initiated) and data at the cut-off point, which signals 
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the end of the evaluation period (so-called end or culmination data) (Cloete, 
2017:17) and is more about having the ability to analyse. The person who carries 
the title of or who is called an evaluator should possess the capacity to analyse 
(and is therefore an analyst) because evaluation is about “judging the value of 
information and ideas” (Huitt, 2011:1).  
However, there is no better way to explain the concept “evaluation” and what 
evaluators do (or are expected to be able to do and the requisite cognitive abilities) 
than examining what Bloom et al.’s (1956) Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: 
The Classification of Educational Goals says about “evaluation” as a cognitive 
skill. According to Bloom et al. (1956), an evaluator must possess the highest 
level of cognitive abilities. According to Bloom et al.’s (1956) classification of 
educational goals, before a person qualifies as an evaluator or acquires the status 
of “evaluation expert (or practitioner)”, he/she must first successfully complete 
the different stages of cognitive domains. Firstly, the evaluator must be trained “to 
recognise and recall facts” (remember) about the evaluand (the object and subject 
of evaluation). Secondly, he/she must be able to understand what the facts mean 
(understand). Thirdly, he/she must be able to apply the facts, rules, and ideas 
(apply). Fourthly, he/she must be able to break down the information into 
component parts (analyse). The fifth stage, which is more applicable to this 
research, is possessing the abilities to judge the value of information and ideas 
(evaluate), and the sixth and final highest stage is the ability to create, which is 
explained as the ability to use the information before him/her to make 
recommendations for improvement and make evidence-based decisions on the 
way forward (Bloom et al., 1956; Huitt, 2011:1-2). Following is Bloom’s 
Taxonomy created by the University of Kansas and published on UARK.EDU. 
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Figure-1: Figure 1: Bloom’s Taxonomy in the form of a multi-tiered cake or 
“cake-style” hierarchy  
 
Source: (University of Kansas and UARK.EDU, n.d.:2). 
To understand the true meaning and the importance of evaluation, one must 
consider the position of evaluation in Figure 1. To evaluate is to “choose, 
estimate, judge, defend, criticise, justify” (Bloom et al., 1956; Huitt, 2011:1-2). In 
order to be able to “justify”, one must “present facts or evidence, defend one’s 
opinion by making judgements about information”, and finally defending “the 
validity of ideas or quality of work based on a set of criteria” (Huitt, 2011:1).The 
ability to know what happened does not make one an evaluator. It is the ability to 
explain the meaning of what happened to the management, the stakeholders, and 
the beneficiaries, etc. and then to explain “why” what happened, happened the 
way it did, and to make evidence-based conclusions and recommendations for 
future improvement of the evaluand that distinguishes competent evaluators from 
false or incompetent ones. This is what makes evaluation “a higher-order policy 
management function”, as noted by Cloete (2009:309). That is why evaluation is 
placed at number five (second highest) just under “create” as the sixth and highest 
cognitive skill on the six “cognitive domains” (Bloom et al., 1956). The author’s 
firm view is that evaluators cannot provide a valid and convincing explanation 
about why things have happened the way they did without complete knowledge 
6 
and appraisal of the different environmental factors or factors that have affected 
government interventions.  
The fact that evaluators must deeply think about all output, outcomes, and impact 
(both positive and negative, intended and unintended, direct and indirect) and then 
think about all possible factors that could have led to the observed success or 
failure of the government intervention in terms of what they had set out to 
achieve, and why unexpected results are occurring (Bhikhoo and Louw-Potgieter, 
2014:152) has also been advocated by Kusek and Rist (2004:12), who define 
evaluation as the systematic, objective, and contextualised assessment of an 
ongoing or completed government intervention from the design to the 
implementation and results. This view has also been advocated by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2002:21), 
which defines evaluation as the ability to determine the relevance and fulfilment 
of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and the sustainability 
of the results.  
The definitions provided by the OECD (2002:2), Kusek and Rist (2004:12), Rossi, 
Lipsey and Freeman (2004:58,427), and Owen (2006:255) suggest that evaluation 
goes beyond the verification of “compliance to aspects contained in the plan” as 
suggested by Ho (2003:68-70) and includes planned and unplanned, intended and 
unintended, positive and negative, direct and indirect output, outcomes, and 
impacts of the interventions and their sustainability. According to Rossi, Lipsey 
and Freeman (2004:16), evaluation uses “social research methods in order to 
systematically investigate the effectiveness of social intervention programmes in 
ways that are adapted to their political and organisational environments…” The 
fact that the “results” of government interventions must be “relevant” implies that 
they must be relevant in terms of addressing the socioeconomic issues that affect 
communities, which also emphasises the importance of context or environment.  
Finally, the emphasis on context in evaluation is also highlighted by Scriven 
(2003:7), who argues that while “evaluators need a repertoire of empirical 
research skills, they also require additional evaluative skills that enable them to 
search for ‘side effects’ that may influence the evaluation conclusion, determine 
relevant technical, legal and scientific values and synthesis skills to integrate 
evaluative and factual information.” Scriven’s (2003:7) emphasis on the 
importance of “side effects” is further confirmation that the M&E of government 
interventions does not happen in a vacuum. Scriven’s (2003:7) argument is 
supported by Woodrow and Oatley (2013:4), who also argue that M&E is 
conducted within the context or environment in which government interventions 
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take place. Following are the main categories of environmental and contextual 
factors that influence government interventions. 
3. NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (ACT OF GOD) VERSUS 
INTELLECTUAL (ACT OF MAN, MAN-MADE) ENVIRONMENTAL 
FACTORS 
The literature review shows that M&E takes place within two types of 
environments, namely the natural environment and the man-made environment. 
Natural environmental factors (also often called acts of God) include things that 
take place without human effort, desire, control, or intervention, such as 
earthquakes, climate change, draught, tsunamis, hurricanes, rain, sun, etc., but 
which have major impacts on human activities and human existence. For example, 
a government could decide to intervene in solving a housing problem in a 
particular community. While construction is underway, a hurricane (such as 
cyclone Idai which befell Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe in 2019) destroys 
villages, killing thousands of people, and destroying almost everything in its path, 
including government housing projects. A full explanation of their effects on the 
failure or success of these interventions must be emphasised in the evaluation 
report.  
In addition, government interventions are also affected by anthropogenic (also 
called man-made or intellectual) factors. These are environmental factors that take 
place inside and outside the organisation as a result of human (physical and 
intellectual) action. For example, the success or failure of government 
interventions can be affected by political instability, prolonged labour union 
strikes, war, corruption, poor management or leadership, human laziness, or 
increased human productivity, which are all the result of human intellectual 
activities (behaviour, action, or inaction). Different types of man-made factors and 
their effects on government interventions are discussed in the following section. 
3.1 Internal versus external environment factors 
The internal or micro environment is generally within the parameters of the 
organisation and includes the “creation of the application of legislation, 
regulations, codes and rules, vision and mission, strategic objectives, management 
(role players), organisational arrangements and structures (infrastructure), policies 
and procedures, systems, [and] institutional resources (people, capital, skills)” 
(Uwizeyimana, 2018).  
There are two main types of external factors. These include external-meso 
environmental factors, which occur outside the parameters of public institutions 
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but at national (domestic) level. Factors from outside the organisation at national 
level include people, systems, resources, equipment, machinery, changes in 
existing laws or the introduction of new ones, demographic changes, levels of 
crime in society, etc. They also include technological factors (e.g. methods, 
computers, equipment, techniques, etc.), economical (e.g. fiscal arrangements, 
taxes, grants, etc.), social (e.g. unemployment, crime, etc.), political (e.g. 
legislation, political parties, etc.), cultural (e.g. diversity, religion, etc.), legal (e.g. 
regulations, policies, implications, etc.), and cultural factors (e.g. diversity, 
religion, language, etc.).  
Other external factors are those that take place in the external or macro 
environment outside the country in the global (international) environment. They 
include factors such as the effects of the economic crisis of 2008 on national 
economies and budgets, the effects of global warming and climate change on local 
people, the effects of the trade war between the United States of America’s 
President Donald Trump and China, etc. on exports and national budgets, 
especially in developing countries. For example, many developing countries 
depend on aid to fund their budgets and on Western development agencies to 
provide basic services to their people. Economic problems in Western countries 
have dire and direct effects on people in aid-dependent countries such as in Africa 
because Western donors tend to cut foreign aid to poor countries when they are 
facing financial crises at home.  
In summary, natural and man-made phenomena inside and outside organisations 
exert one or a combination of different effects individually and all of them 
together exert a combined effect on government interventions. Their individual 
and composite effects could be tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, formal 
or informal, direct or indirect. The multiple effects from the influence of 
phenomena and actors within and outside organisations create a complex and 
chaotic web of effects on organisations and on government interventions and the 
environment in which the M&E of government interventions is conducted. The 
nature and causes of the chaotic and complex environment in which government 
interventions are implemented and evaluated are discussed next. 
4. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS: THE THEORY OF CHAOS AND 
COMPLEXITY WITHIN THE M&E OF GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTIONS ENVIRONMENT 
Cloete (2006:2) and Kayuni (2010:30) argue that attempts to interpret, analyse, 
assess, or expand on the relevance of chaos and complexity for different aspects 
of public management have largely been undertaken in the early 2000s. However, 
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there is no known study that has focused on the effects of chaos and complexity 
on the M&E of government interventions in the current literature. First of all, 
while there are common features between a complex and a chaotic environment, 
“the two concepts are different” (Rickles, Hawe and Shiell, 2007:933). A system 
becomes “complex” when it generates “rich, collective, dynamical behaviour from 
simple interactions between large numbers of its subunits” (Rickles, Hawe and 
Shiell, 2007:933).  
Furthermore, interactions between and among sub-units within a complex system 
generate emergent properties in the unit system that cannot be reduced to the sub-
units (Rickles, Hawe and Shiell, 2007:933; Morgan and McMahon, 2017:17). For 
example, it was argued above that multiple factors from the natural environment 
and intellectual (man-made) environment that exist within the internal and 
external environment of the organisation in which the M&E of government 
interventions takes place generate quite a large number of effects (political, 
economic, social, technological, legal, etc.). Each type of environment and each 
type of factor generated are sub-units of the organisational system. Organisations 
are faced with multiple factors from both within and outside their environments 
because they are open systems. Government institutions are open systems because 
they depend on the environment in which they operate; the environment is 
dependent on them and there is a specific interaction between the system and the 
environment. An open system requires “organisational inputs from the 
environment, organisational processing by the organisation, organisational output 
and feedback to the environment” (Bernhardt, 2018:47).  
Cloete (2006:2) argues that chaos is not the same as complexity and a complex 
environment differs from a chaotic environment. As Cloete (2006:2) explains, 
even though complex systems carry a heightened level of complexity, they might 
be following webs of predictable patterns that can be identified and studied in a 
systematic manner, while chaotic environments are totally random and 
unpredictable. Cloete (2006:1) states, “Chaos is when everything seems to be on 
the verge of collapse in a particular moment (let’s say today), yet somehow and 
for some [unknown] reasons [the something] emerges at a later stage (tomorrow, 
next week, next month or some years later) – in a new form with new structures or 
relationship.” Therefore, the use of chaos theory in the evaluation of government 
interventions is also concerned with “non-linear systems – systems in which an 
external change at local (micro) levels and at international (macro) levels causes 
disproportionate effects”, which randomly create new forms, new structures, and 
new relationships between the different units and subunits of an organisation 
(Muthan, 2015:15-17), which is argued to be an open system. The synonyms of 
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the concept “random” are “chance, accidental, haphazard, arbitrary, casual, 
unsystematic, indiscriminate and unplanned” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2018).  
According to Lomofsky (2016:9), what all this means is that change in the 
environment in which government interventions are implemented is chaotic 
simply because it is “beyond our control”, it is “dynamic and multidimensional”, 
it is “cumulative, with tipping points”, it is always ”emergent and often 
unexpected”, it “involves people who behave in ways that we cannot predetermine 
and have agency (we cannot control what they do or how they think)”, and, 
finally, it “necessitates basing our programme design on evidence of what works; 
and does not take place in isolation and happens at different levels of the system” 
(Lomofsky, 2016:9). 
The fact that an open system is affected by multiple factors from the internal and 
external environment (both natural and man-made) listed above in non-linear, 
unpredictable, and random ways that explain chaos in the organisation and its 
environments fits well with the phenomenon popularly known as the “butterfly 
effect” (Cronjé, 2014:21). The butterfly effect refers to “the phenomenon whereby 
a minute localized change in a complex system can have large effects elsewhere” 
(Basu, 2017:1). Schneider and Somers (2006:351) argue that Edward Lorenz “first 
encountered the butterfly effect while studying weather patterns, pointing to the 
inherent nonlinearity of such systems due to the high degree of inter-relatedness 
between its parts.” If one considers the butterfly effect, it can be argued that each 
part of the organisational environment affects the others in unpredictable ways 
and while the effect of one unit on the others in a complex system can be 
identified and isolated using systematic methods (e.g. the effects of a budget cut 
as a result of the economic downturn on the organisation’s ability to complete 
projects – meeting the specified timeline, quality and quantity), the effects of one 
unit on the others in a chaotic situation are difficult to isolate simply because such 
interactions are random and highly unpredictable (Muthan, 2015:15-16).  
The butterfly effect is a feature of M&E because of the multiple levels and 
multiple sources of the different factors inside and outside organisations and the 
fact that organisations are open systems that cannot stop their influence on the 
external environment and cannot escape from being influenced by factors from 
within and from outside their boundaries. For example, an economic downturn in 
South Africa, which is caused by the falling demand for South African 
commodities by China, the United States of America, or the United Kingdom (to 
name but a few), will most likely affect the South African government’s ability to 
fund its national, provincial, and local governments and state-owned entities such 
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as Eskom, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), and South 
African Airways (SAA), among others. Each one of these organisations’ ability to 
obtain the necessary funding will affect their ability to buy inputs (pay 
staff/people, material, etc.). Lower salaries might be paid, and staff retrenchment 
might follow, which could lead to strikes and destruction of property by striking 
workers. In other cases, lack of or low budget can lead to cutting corners by using 
poor-quality material and as a result producing poor-quality output, poor 
outcomes, and negative impacts for the South African people. Clearly, the cause 
of all this is something that takes place outside the African continent and over 
which even the South African government has no control. Yet the South African 
government, the different government institutions, and each person living in South 
Africa cannot escape the effects because of the globalised open market system in 
which countries operate. This single factor can have what Schneider and Somers 
(2006:351) call “the butterfly effect” on the whole South African government 
system. 
A close analysis of Cloete’s (2006) argument seems to suggest the existence of 
two different types of chaos in the environment. There seem to be types of chaos 
that Cloete (2006:1) calls “deterministic chaos” and “quantum chaotic” or 
“random chaotic.” While “both so-called chaos (deterministic chaos) and quantum 
(randomly chaotic) are regarded as examples of the functioning of open systems”, 
the two types of chaos differ (Cloete, 2006:1). According to Cloete (2006:2), 
“quantum chaos” is “un-deterministic” and therefore more difficult to predict than 
deterministic chaos. For example, as Cloete (2006:2) puts it, a deterministic 
chaotic situation or phenomenon is less complex and has more order and 
predictability than a “quantum chaotic situation or phenomena”, “which are truly 
randomly chaotic and are replete with puzzling paradoxes and contra-intuitive 
characteristics” (Cloete, 2006:2). While Thornhill (2016:47) agrees with Cloete’s 
(2006) argument that quantum chaos is randomly chaotic, he emphasises that 
quantum chaos only takes place at the quantum or molecular level of the system. 
Thornhill’s (2016:47) location of the quantum chaos at the sub-atomic level 
contradicts Cloete’s (2006) suggestion that quantum (randomly chaotic) is 
regarded as an example of the functioning of open systems. Thornhill (2016:48) 
explains that “the size of an atom as a constituent of a molecule is estimated as 
one ten millions of a millimetre (1/10ˉ⁶)” and he argues that at quantum level, 
“the study would involve the anomalous behaviour of particles within an atom” 
(Thornhill, 2016:48).  
The fact that neither Cloete (2006:2) nor Thornhill (2016:47) indicates what 
constitutes the quantum level of a public or private organisation or whether M&E 
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at the quantum level would produce meaningful and useful results for evaluators 
suggests that the M&E of government interventions at the quantum level of an 
organisation might be difficult and might not even be useful for the purpose of 
this study. However, this in no way suggests that chaos at the quantum level does 
not impact the whole system and other systems far away, if one considers the 
butterfly effect discussed above. It is simply agreeing with Auriacombe and 
Ackron’s (2015:15) argument that an attempt to evaluate tiny particles of a bigger 
and complex (open) system is a futile exercise and will not be able to fulfil the 
objectives of an evaluation because the evaluation of the whole system 
(considering the effects of all its components) is not the same or equal to the sum 
of the multiple micro-level evaluations of the same system.  
 
Hence the evaluation of the whole system is far greater than the sum of the 
evaluations of its constituent components (Bergoeing, Loayza and Piguillem, 
2015:268), because organisations are open systems (Evan, 1993:5) and the 
interactions among their different parts and the effects on the whole system 
happen in a chaotic and complex way (Oehmen, Thuesen, Ruiz and Geraldi, 
2015:6); the only meaningful and useful M&E of government interventions would 
pay serious attention to the effects of the different environmental factors within 
and outside these organisations. 
Finally, based on the findings in this paper, the first thing M&E experts and 
scholars must do in order to conduct valid evaluations of government 
interventions in a complex and chaotic organisational environment is to accept the 
fact that change is chaotic and complex and is a permanent part of our lives 
(Baggio & Sainaghi, 2011:2). According to Cloete (2006:45), if evaluators accept 
that organisations are complex, dynamic, self-organising systems and are able to 
view M&E as a social science phenomenon to which chaos and complexity 
theories apply, then they will be able to improve their abilities to manage and 
evaluate “change in times of … chaos and transitions to new orders of being.” 
Evaluators need to change their mindset and methods of evaluation in order to 
match the current reality. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the factors that influence Monitoring and 
Evaluation (M&E) of government interventions in a chaotic and complex 
organisational environment. Its main argument was that the M&E of government 
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interventions takes place within an ever-changing, complex, and often chaotic 
environment because organisations are open systems. The factors that influence 
the M&E of government interventions within a chaotic and complex 
organisational environment presented in this paper are many. Among the many 
environmental factors that M&E scholars and experts must identify and whose 
effects they must consider when conducting M&E of government interventions 
are the direct and indirect effects of the natural environment and man-made 
(intellectual) environment. These two types of environments exist and operate 
inside and outside organisations at the same time, and they constantly affect each 
other and are constantly affected by multiple factors related to local/national and 
global events (i.e. phenomena) such as social, political, technological, cultural, 
and legal factors. It has been argued that a complex system contains a large 
number of autonomous parts, and that these parts are connected to each other and 
interact with each other in visible and invisible ways. Because of the complex and 
unpredictable interactions among the different parts of the system, an evaluation 
of the different parts of a complex system cannot be the same or equal to the 
evaluation of the whole system. 
The combined effects of these multiple environmental factors create a complex 
and chaotic environment for government interventions, which requires evaluators 
to possess appropriate evaluation competencies. Because evaluation is a higher-
order management function, it is highly ranked on Bloom et al.’s (1956) 
taxonomy which was discussed in this paper.  
The chaos and complex environment in which government interventions are 
evaluated present a golden opportunity for professors and M&E experts at the 
institutions of higher learning such as universities to urgently start the process of 
coding M&E professional standards, skills, knowledge, attitudes and cognitive 
abilities in order to design appropriate M&E training programmes. It also requires 
people who want a career in M&E to gain appropriate M&E skills and 
qualifications that correspond with the cognitive levels highlighted in the Bloom’s 
Taxonomy of the Cognitive Domain. Doing so will empower them to deal with 
the compounded effects of multiple factors that create the chaotic and complex 
environment and influence the M&E of government interventions.  
Based on the above conclusion, the following need to be explored further: 
 The quality and level of M&E training programmes that are currently 
provided at institutions of higher learning. 
 The quality and level of qualifications and cognitive skills of current M&E 
practitioners. 
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